but they cannot be allowed to subsist if the distinction between true and false, proved and unproved is to keep its meaning. There is no sharply drawn line between those contradictions which occur in the daily work of every mathematician, beginner or master of his craft, as the result of more or less easily detected mistakes, and the major paradoxes which provide food for logical thought for decades and sometimes centuries. Absence of contradiction, in mathematics as a whole or in any given branch of it, thus appears as an empirical fact, rather than as a metaphysical principle. The more a given branch has been developed, the less likely it becomes that contradictions may be met with in its further development. At the same time, even in the best established branches of our science, everyone knows that an unskilful, or too skilful, use of the existing terminology and notations can lead to ambiguities and eventually to contradictions. I am not, merely referring to those "abus de langage" without which no mathematical text would be readable; a cursory examination of many existing notations will show that few are altogether foolproof, in the sense that the ambiguities inherent in most of them cannot be removed without complicating them to the point of uselessness. As an example to the point, one can mention the use of parentheses and brackets, and the gentleman's agreements in virtue of which these may frequently be omitted.
What will be the working mathematician's attitude when confronted with such dilemmas? It need not, I believe, be other than strictly empirical. We cannot hope to prove that every definition, every symbol, every abbreviation that we introduce is free from potential ambiguities, that it does not bring about the possibility of a contradiction that might not otherwise have been present. Let the rules be so formulated, the definitions so laid out, that every contradiction may most easily be traced back to its cause, and the latter either removed or so surrounded by warning signs as to prevent serious trouble. This, to the mathematician, ought to be sufficient; and it is with this comparatively modest and limited objective in view that I have sought to lay the foundations for my mathematical treatise, in the manner which I shall presently describe.
As every one agrees today, the distinctive character of a mathematical text is that it can be formalized, i.e., translated into a certain kind of sign-language. The first thing I have to do is therefore to lay down the vocabulary and grammar of the sign-language I wish to use, in its pure form at first, and later with all the modifications which usage has taught us to be required. The choice between substantially equivalent sign-languages (i.e., such that unambiguous translation from one to the other is possible) is of course merely a matter of convenience; and in my choice I have been guided chiefly by mathematical rather than logical considerations. The signs I use are as follows: 10 arguments (or variables), which are arbitrary signs, usually letters from some alphabet, sometimes modified by subscripts, accents, etc.; 20 the surrounding line 0 ;' for the convenience of the printer, and, as experience soon indicates, for greater legibility, this is to be replaced at a very early stage by the usual parentheses, brackets, etc., thereby probably losing once for all the advantages of an entirely unambiguous and foolproof notation; 30 the connecting signs, viz., (a) not, and, or, and (b) the quantifiers V, 3; 40 the mathematical signs = e, 1; 50 abbreviations, to be introduced and defined one by one as they become needed.
Certain combinations of the above signs will be called relations, i.e., wellformed formulas;2 any argument occurring in a relation will be said to be free or bound; certain relations will be called true relations; and I give an operational manual, enabling its users to write relations, and in particular true relations, and to distinguish between free and bound arguments. The manual is as follows:
(a) A relation is formed by writing one argument to the left and one to the right of the sign =, or of the sign (, or one to the left, and two to the right of the sign {; all arguments are free.
(b) A relation is formed by copying an already written relation, surrounding it by a surrounding line, and writing not to the left of it; free and bound variables remain the same as in the former relation.
Using an obvious "short-hand," the first part of rule (b) can be reformulated more briefly as follows: if R is a relation, not (R) is a relations Here it should be understood that R is not an argument (there is no need, at this level, for the "propositional variables" which become indispensable at the higher level of metamathematical reasoning); and to say that it "is" a relation is of course inaccurate, but can, I believe, cause no misunderstanding. The sequence of signs not (R), with an R which may be replaced by a relation as explained above, will be called a scheme: it is such that it becomes a relation whenever the letter R is replaced by a relation. The same conventions will be used to state more briefly the following rules:
(c) If R, S are two relations, and no argument is free in one and bound in the other, then (R) and (S), (R) or (S), are relations; the free (bound) arguments in these are the arguments which are free (bound) in one at least of the relations R, S.
(d) A relation is formed by surrounding a relation R by a surrounding line, writing to the left of this any argument other than a bound one in R, and, to the left of this, one of the signs V, 3; this will be expressed more briefly (but inaccurately) as follows: if R is a relation, and x an argument which is not bound in R, then Vx(R), 3x(k) are relations. The bound arguments in these are x and the bound arguments in R; all others are free.
(e) Whenever an abbreviation is introduced, a rule must be given, stating how it may be used in writing relations, and which arguments are free and which are bound in a relation which is so written.
In the usual manner (by a type of proof which may be described as "experimental induction"), one can show that, in a relation without abbreviations, bound variables are those which occur immediately after an V or 3, all others being free. 2My attention has been drawn to the fact that American logicians use the word "relation" with another meaning. I shall, however, go on using it here in the sense to which I am accustomed, and which is in agreement with French usage.
'For typographical reasons, parentheses had to be substituted for surrounding lines wherever these occurred in the present address; thus, "not (R)" takes the place of "not ?". From now on, surrounding lines will be replaced by parentheses, these being omitted whenever the meaning is clear without them. By a scheme is understood a design wherein certain letters R, S, etc., occur, and which becomes a relation, according to the above rules, whenever R, S, etc., are replaced by relations, possibly with some (explicitly stated) restrictions as to the arguments, free and bound, in these relations. Such a scheme must always be a combination of the "fundamental schemes" occurring in the rules (b), (c), (d), and (e) . For example, 3x((not(Vy(R))) or (S)) where y must not be bound in R, nor free in S; no argument, other than y, can be free in R and bound in S, or bound in R and free in S; and x must not be bound either in R or in S.
Furthermore, an operation is now introduced, the replacement of an argument by another in a relation. If R is a relation, the replacement of x by y is permissible: (a) if x and y do not both occur in R; (b) if x and y are both free in R; and it is performed by writing y, in R, wherever x was previously written; this does not change R if x does not occur in it. It will be convenient, in what follows, to write, e.g., Rix, y, z) for a relation where x, y, z occur either as free arguments or not at all, and RIx, y, yJ for the result of the replacement of z by y in this. Now the rules of inference can be formulated; I have found it convenient to do this in two stages, although the separation between these is somewhat artificial and arbitrary. First I introduce the concept of synonymous relations, defined by the following rules (where the restrictions as to arguments in the schemes have been left out):
(s 1-2) Synonymy is "reflexive," "symmetric," and "transitive." (s 3) If, in any one of the fundamental schemes, a relation R is replaced by a synonymous relation R', the new relation is synonymous to the earlier one.
(s 4) not (not R) is synonymous to R. (s 5) not (R and S) is synonymous to (not R) or (not S). (s 6) not ((Vx(R)) is synonymous to 3x(not R).
(s 7, 9, 10) Commutativity, associativity, distributivity of "and" and "or". From the above rules, a large number of further rules can easily be derived; this wvill be omitted here; but, before proceeding to the list of mathematical axioms which I use, I must explain the meaning I give to "axioms," "proofs," and "theories," and a very convenient extension of the above rules to concrete mathematical situations.
If our logical system is to be the grammar of the mathematical language as it is actually used, it must take into account the fact that the truth of a relation is seldom understood in the absolute sense described above, but more usually in a relative sense, which depends upon the assumptions of the moment. Similarly, quantification mostly occurs in a relative sense, the quantified argument being assumed to belong to a given "type." 0e course this does not require the introduction of any new logical concepts; but it suggests the use of certain abbreviations which I have found very convenient, and which are as follows.
By a proof, I understand a section of a mathematical text, beginning with some relations and schemes of relations, which are called the hypotheses of the proof; the only schemes which occur among the hypotheses of mathematical proofs are two schemes which I shall write later, and they are such that, after the empty spaces in them have been duly filled, the relations which are so obtained contain no free argument; on the other hand, the relations which occur among the hypotheses may contain free arguments.
If P is a proof, a relation R will be called P-true: (a) if it is a conjunction of relations occurring among the hypotheses of P, or derived from schemes occurring among these hypotheses by filling up the empty spaces in a permissible manner; (b) if it occurs in a true relation A -* R, where A is a conjunction of the kind described in (a). Now, denote by (d' 1-5) five rules, entirely similar to the rules (d 1-5) for the deduction of true relations, except that P-truth is to be substituted for (absolute) truth; it is easily seen that these rules are valid, as consequences of the earlier ones. As to (d 6), it remains valid in the following restricted form: (d' 6) If R is P-true, and if the argument x does not occur as a free argument in the hypotheses of P, Vx(R) is P-true.
Other (derived) rules of deduction also remain valid, some of them with restrictions similar to that occurring in (d' 6), provided the abbreviations -A, are replaced by P---+, P-+-+, with obvious meanings. By "abus de langage," the P in these abbreviations, and in "P-true," may be omitted whenever there can be no doubt about what is meant.
Suppose now that an argument u is free in one, and no more than one, of the hypotheses of P; call that hypothesis H uI. Then we introduce two abbreviations, viz. VH and 3H; these may be used in the same way as the quantifiers V and 3; moreover, VHX(R) and 3HX(R) are to be synonymous with Vx(H{x} -* R) and 3x(H{x} and R) respectively. These signs will be called the "typical" quantifiers, and an argument x which follows such a quantifier will be called a "typical" argument, of the "type" determined by H. It will now be seen that (d' 6) can be strengthened as follows: (d" 6) If R is P-true, and if u is a free argument in a hypothesis H(u} of P and in no other, VHU(R) is P-true.
All rules of deduction can be extended in a similar manner; and so can the rules of synonymy, provided that synonymy is replaced by P-equivalence. A proof P then consists of a chain of P-true relations, so arranged that the P-truth of each is apparent from the P-truth of the preceding ones by the application of the above rules. A theory is a section of a mathematical text, consisting of a number of proofs which are grouped together for convenience, e.g. because they all have some hypotheses in common; the latter are called the axioms of the theory. If T is a theory, T-truth is to be interpreted, in relation to the axioms of T, exactly as P-truth in relation to the hypotheses of a proof P; and typical quantification will be used similarly. A theory T' is said to be an extension of a theory T, and T to be antecedent to T', if T' has all the axioms of T, and some more. A theory T is called contradictory whenever a relation R has been found such that "R and not R" is T-true. A favorite way of proving the T-truth of a relation R is to show that the theory T', with the axioms of T, and not R as additional axiom, is contradictory (reductio ad absurdum).
As every one knows, all mathematical theories can be considered as extensions of the general theory of sets, so that, in order to clarify my position as to the foundations of mathematics, it only remains for me to state the axioms which I use for that theory. These are the following:
E ( (where y is an argument which is not one of the arguments occurring in R{xj) is true. Whenever R is functional in the argument x, we allow ourselves to introduce an abbreviation, called a "functional symbol," which may (and will) very much vary in shape and outward appearance, except that it usually will contain the arguments, other than x, which are free in R; if e.g. fR is this symbol, then x = fR is synonymous with Rixi. This is of course nothing else than the L-symbol, well-known to all logicians; and there is a theorem (for the proof of which I refer you to a paper by B. Rosser) on the possibility of "eliminating" this symbol, provided it is consistently denoted by the t-notation; but I am not sure of what may be the value of such a proof for the working mathe-
